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A Framework for Resolving Africa's Debt Crisis
P. J. Obaseki and B. G. Bello*

This paper examines the variou., measures which have been put in place in the past to
resolve Africa) debt crisis. Relevant economic indicalors show thaJAfrica) outstanding
debt is very large considering the continent) weakproduction stuctures, negative external
balances and high external debt service burden. Variou., stralegies adopted in the past
to resolve Africa) debt crisis seem to have failed to addre33 the debt service capacity of
African countries. The paper suggests thaJ an alternativeframework for resolving Africa)
debt crisis would be predicated on the existence of conducive domestic economic
conditions and understanding by the inlernalional community. Thus, the creditor must
concede significant grounds on debt relieffor Africa to enable the faller generale enough
resources thaJ would eventually be deployed lo service its outstanding debt. In this
connection, ii would be helpfa I ifAfrica) debt burden is limited to its capacity to service
such debt. Specific policy measures are recommendedfor resolving Africa) debt crisis.
The allainment ofmacroeconomic balance and the pursuit ofgrowth-oriented structural
adjustment by debtor nations are essential for any meaningful reduction of the debt
burden ofdebt-distressed countries whatever policies are adopted

I.

INTRODUCTION

The impact of the international debt crisis, which erupted in the last quarter of 1982
in Africa, has been most devastating. The debt crisis facing the continent is of grave
consequences especially given the fact that the terms of international payments also
turned against Africa at the onset of the debt crisis. African countries had acquired
large sums of external finance over time to bridge the gap between domestic savings
and investment. lhls process was influenced by the belief in the traditional concept
of bridging the savings-investment gap in order to accelerate the process of economic
growth and development. The conventional wisdom was that the gap between
savings and investment can be bridged either by reducing domestic investment to a
level consistent with domestic savings or augmenting domestic savings with borrowed
foreign capital. In the former case, economic growth would either stagnate or decline
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and income would be depressed, while in the latter, economic growth would
accelerate if the loans were optimally deployed to finance viable projects.
It is possible for foreign capital to flow into a politically stable economy if the real
interest rate is either higher than the international interest rate or the rate of interest
in the country exporting the capital. This would either be in form of direct investment
or some form of short-term capital. The management of savings-investment gap is
an important aspect of macroeconomic policy and as such, the management of external
debt, to the extent that it has implications for balance of payments stability, has a
bearing on the entire framework of macroeconomic policy analysis. When more
external loans are acquired, and depending on their disposition, they tend to increase
current expenditure and the future debt service profile of a country. Unless the higher
expenditure and higher debt service costs for the balance of payments are sustamable,
a country will face external payments and debt service difficulties, and it may have
lo adjust its policies, reduce expenditure and accept lower level of economic growth
and welfare (Hassanali, 1985:5). A sustainable external debt service position depends
on, among other things, the deployment of external borrowings in productive
investments, the attainment of an aggregate savings target that isin excess of domestic
investment, and the maintenance of growth in output in excess of population growth
rate. Thus, external loans' acquisition should only be contemplated when the domestic
economic and investment environment is conducive and would ensure a return on
capital that is higher than the future cost of servicing the loans. In that situation,
additional resources generated in the process of investment would be more than
enough to service maturing obligations as they fall due. Where the cost of servicing
a loan rises above the relative productivity of acquired loans, debt servicing problems
arise. If debt servicing problem becomes difficult to manage, as is presently the case
in Africa, appropriate measures should be put in place to resolve it.
The objective of this paper is to briefly swnrnarise past strategies aimed at resolving
Africa's debt crisis and make recommendations in the form of alternative framework
for permanently resolving the crisis. The rest of the paper is divided into four parts.
Part 11 is a brief discussion of some concepts in external debt analysis. An analysis of
the factors responsible for the growth, character and structure of Africa's debt follows
in Part III. In part IV, past initiatives at resolving the debt crisis are reviewed, while
Part V discusses an alternative framework for addressing the crisis. The paper is
concluded in Part VI.

II.

CONCEPTS IN EXTERNAL DEBT ANALYSIS

Some concepts considered useful in external debt analysis are briefly explained in
this section. The relevant ones, in the context of this paper, are debt service burden
and debt service capacity. Debt service burden refers to the weight of debt service
payments relative to the proportion of national income devoted to servicing the
economy. In a more restricted form, debt service burden may be defined in terms of
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the proportion of export of goods and services devoted to debt service payments visa-vis the servicing of the economy as a whole. The more the proportion of the earnings
from exports of goods and services that is devoted to debt service payments, the less
the proportion left for consumption and investment purposes. The debt service
burden increases when export receipts decline or the returns on borrowed capital
decreases. External debt would not constitute a burden, however, if loans are
optimally deployed so that returns on investment are sufficient to service maturing
obligations. This is the case because the servicing of the domestic economy is not
impaired. Debt service problem would arise when maturing obligations cannot be
redeemed either owing to liquidity or insolvency problems. A country is likely to
experience a temporary liquidity problem when receipts from exports decline below
the minimum debt servicing requirements. Insolvency occurs when a country finds
it difficult to meet its debt service obligations on a permanent basis and its
creditworthiness is eroded.
Debt service capacity, on the other hand, represents the debt service absorption
level or the ability of a debtor country to service its debts. If a country can service its
debt obligations on schedule and the financing of domestic investment is not
constrained, the debt service capacity is normal. However, if a country finds it difficult
to service its debts without recourse to debt rescheduling and has a tendency to
repayment defaults, the debt service capacity is being undermined. The more a
country adjusts its consumption and investment outlays to meet its external debt
obligations, the lower is its debt service capacity. Thus, the debt service capacity is
dependent on the returns on investment, the sort of borrowing (whether soft or hard)
and the rate of savings (Edelman, 1983:230). The debt service capacity of many debtdistressed countries is eroded by high import bills and dwindling export receipts as
the demand for foreign exchange is increased while the supply declines. Added to
this is the rising international interest rates and the low productivity of capital in the
debtor countries. Debt servicing capacity can only be retained in the long term when
the growth of per capita income and the rapid accumulation of highly productive
foreign capital are sustained. However, if international demand for a country's
product rises only sluggishly or domestic production is not competitive or if export
sales fluctuate persistently, a country's ability to sustain a given level of debt service
capacity will be seriously impaired (IBRD, 1963:12). The foreign exchange constraint
indicated above is at the heart of the debt service crisis facing Africa. If debt acquisition
cannot enhance economic growth beyond what domestic resources alone can achieve,
its acquisition might not be beneficial as this would lead to debt servicing problems.
Where the cost of borrowing is lower than the returns on capital and the rate of
savings consequent on the acquisition of foreign capital is higher than the international
rate of interest and large enough to service the debts as they fall due, the debt service
capacity could be said to be high and the servicing of debt could be better managed.
Inmost cases, the distinction between debt service burden and debt service capacity
is blurred. When debt service burden is caused by temporary shortfalls in foreign
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exchange earnings and it is possible to reverse the situation, debt service burden
may not reflect low debt service capacity. When debt service burden is, however,
due to sustained shortfall in foreign exchange supply and the weakness of the domestic
economy, low debt service capacity becomes entrenched. Thus, the strength of the
domestic economy determines largely the state of a country's debt service capacity.
The type of domestic economic policies pursued, their rationality and effectiveness,
substantially contribute to the determination of a nation's debt service capacity. This
is the case because such policies affect the major determinants of debt service burden
which, when sustained, impinge on the debt service capacity.

III.

ANALYSIS OF AFRICA'S DEBT

The causes, growth, magnitude and structure of Africa's debt must be properly
understood in order to place the impact of the debt burden in a proper perspective.
Many reasons have been advanced to explain the origin of the international debt
crisis in general. These include decline in commodity prices, increases in the rate of
interest, and external shocks owing to oil price increases. In the case of Africa, other
explanatory factors include inefficient investment of loan funds, general
mismanagement of the economy and serious deterioration in the general terms of
trade (Ojo, 1994:28).
Iota! external debt outstanding for Africa grew from $84.8 billion in 1980 to $132.1
billion by 1984, a few years after the commencement of the international debt crisis.
By 1985, total outstanding debt had grown to $145 .6 billion and rose to $235.2, $235.4
and $235.8 billion by the end of 1990, 1991 and 1992, respectively (Table 1). Total
debt service seems to have grown even faster than outstanding debt stock. From
$11.2 billion in 1980, debt service increased to $19.7 billion by 1985 and reached
$21.9 and$29.7billion by 1990 and 1991,respectively. An examination of the structure
of Africa's debt shows that although short-term debt has consistently constituted a
small proportion of total debt, it has steadily grown over the years. Short-term debt
which was only $9.5 billion in 1980, stood at $22.4 and $28.2 billion by 1985 and
1992, respectively. This contrasted with $75.3 billion, $123.2 billion and $205.6 billion
oflong-term debt over the same periods, respectively. Long-term debts were in excess
of 80 per cent from 1980 through 1992 (Tabk 2). Viewed in terms of whether the
debts are official (multilateral and bilateral with concessional interest rates) or private
(with non-concessional interest rates but distinct from commercial banks' debt), it is
observed that for the region as a whole the proportion of the former is significantly
higher than that of the latter. In 1984, official debt was $69.2 billion or 52.4 per cent
of total debt. It rose to $81.4 billion (55.9 per cent of total debt) by 1985 and increased
further to $135.5 billion (61.3 per cent), $147.1 billion (62.Spercent) and $149.2 billion
(63.4 per cent) by 1989, 1990 and 1991, respectively. This compared with $26.7billion
oi private debt in 1984 which increased to $28.4 billion in 1985 and $36.1, $36.3 and
$36.4 billion over the respective periods. Debt owed to commercial banks rose from
$35.7 billion in 1984 to $46.9, $49.8 and $45.3 billion in 1988, 1991 and 1992,
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respectively. Commercial banks' debts which initially constituted the largest component
of outstanding debts have been overtaken by official debts starting from 1982.
External debt and debt service ratios are some of the most commonly used
indicators of debt burden. It is the debt ratios that establish the impact of the debt
overhang on major macroeconomic aggregates. The unbearable and growth-stifling
nature of Africa's debt burden becomes clearer when viewed from this angle. The
ratio of debt service to exports (debt service/exports ratio), which shows how much
of the region's total export earnings were devoted to debt service (principal and
interest) in a given period, rose from 12.9 per cent in 1980 to 18.9 per cent in 1983.
This increased further to 25.8, 25.5 and 28.3 per cent in 1988, 1990 and 1992,
respectively. In a similar vein, the ratio of total external debt to exports was 90.2 per
cent in 1980 and 262.1 per cent in 1988. It declined only slightly to 229.7percentin
1992 (Table 3). In other words, African countries would require the equivalent of
229.7 per cent of their entire export earnings to pay all their debt in 1992. The ratio of
external debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is also quite revealing. This is a
broader macroeconomic indicator which shows the proportion of total external debt
in total output. In 1980, the continent's total external debt was equivalent to 27.2 per
cent of GDP. The situation deteriorated steadily so that by 1988 the ratio had risen to
65.1 per cent before improving marginally to 62.2 per cent in 1990 and 59.1 per cent
in 1992. The interest service ratio or the ratio of interestpaymenl to export of goods
and services, in addition to showing the severity of the recurrent debt service problem,
also says something about the structure of the debt outstanding. The higher the
ratio, the more likely that the bulk of the debt was obtained from private, nonconcessionary sources. For Africa, it is seen that the ratio rose sharply from 6.7 per
cent in 1980 to 11.4 per cent in 1983 and hovered around this figure throughout the
rest of the 1980s and early 1990s.

IV.

REVIEW OF MAJOR INITIATIVES FOR RESOLVING THE
AFRICAN DEBT CRISIS

Perhaps the major initiatives that have been partially implemented with respect to
bilateral official debt ,.fur Africa are contained in the Toronto terms which were
proposed at the Toy-":.ro summit of 1988. Under this proposal, bilateral creditors
agreeing to debt r{J..ief for low-income countries could choose among three types of
relief to provide on debt which is rescheduled through the Paris Oub:
(1) forgiveness of one-third of the debt service due, with the remainder rescheduled
over a period of 14 years, with 8 years grace;
(2) rescheduling of all eligible obligations over a 14-year period, including 8 years
of grace at interest rates of 3.5 per cent below market or, when market rates are
less than 7 per cent, half the market rate; and
(3) rescheduling of all obligations at market rates, over a period of 25 years,
including 14 years grace (Greene & Khan, 1990:18).
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Mali was the first African country to benefit from the menu of options provided
under this programme when in November 1988 the Paris Oub agreed to implement
the terms for the poorest countries. The programme has, however, been criticized
for its limited application. In addition, some creditors have used the agreed option
to extend maturities rather than reduce principal and interest rates, and the terms of
debt reduction, where they apply, are too low (averaging about 20%) and too slow to
take effect (Helleiner, 1991).
The Trinidad terms (also called the Major plan) were introduced and designed to
improve on the Toronto terms. Originally proposed by John Major in 1990, it called
on creditor countries to double their debt write-offs and to adopt more generous
rescheduling terms. Under the programme, debt burden resulting from rescheduled
debts would be reduced by two-thirds instead of one-third provided under the Toronto
terms. It also provides for the capitalisation of interest payments during the first
five years of the rescheduling period, the linkage of debt repayment to export
performance and the extension of rescheduling period of25 years as against Toronto's
14 years. Although these measures are principally designed to reduce the debt burden
of the poorest and most heavily indebted countries, the majority of which are in
Africa, the implementation has always been hall-hearted. This is mainly because of
the reluctance of creditors to offer genuine concessions and also because of the severe
conditionalities accompanying the measures.
Since the international debt crisis started in 1982, the IMF has attempted to play a
major role in its management and resolution. Specifically, in order to ameliorate
some of the difficulties faced by the severely-indebted, low-income countries, the
Fund designed what is called the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).
The programme provides financial assistance to qualifying countries in the order of
150 per cent of members' quota over a three-year period and, in some cases, up to
350 per cent of quota where the need arises (Greene, 1989). From 1988 when it became
effective to May 1989, approval for ten sub-Saharan Africans (SSA) countries had
already been granted under the program. The countries were the Gambia, Ghana,
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Uganda. In the
same spirit as the Fund's, the World Bank has also been implementing the Special
Programme for Africa (SPA) with a view to providing assistance to distressed
countries. These programmes have, however, been criticized as being inadequate to
solve Africa's debt problem (Greene, 1989). Greene argues that the ESAF and the
SPA have been fully utilized by SSA countries. More importantly, he maintains that
the resources available under the two schemes are small relative to the total debt
service obligations of the region.
An important measure applied by a number of African nations to deal with debts
owed to commercial banks, which constitute a relatively smaller proportion of Africa's
total debt (21.2 per cent as at end-1991) but nevertheless crucial because of the higher
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debt service tenns, is the debt buy-back scheme. Under this scheme, old debts can be
exchanged for new securities. Some of the countries that have implemented the
scheme included Mozambique, Congo and Nigeria. Under an agreement signed in
1992, Nigeria was able to buy back 62 per cent of the debt and used collateralised par
bonds for the remaining 38 per cent. Thus, the country was able to achieve a debt
and debt service reduction to the tune of about $3 billion (DMD, 1992). The debt
buy-back scheme has limited application in Africa. First, the proportion of commercial
bank debt is small, while its impact on the aggregate debt stock is minimal. Second,
since the scheme requires that creditors increase their exposures, the measure is not
attractive to most private creditors because they are not willing to put in more
resources into Africa.
In addition to the above specific measures, the majority of African countries, with
active encouragement by multilateral, bilateral and private commercial creditors,
have implemented comprehensive structural reform programmes. The main
objectives of these programmes are to achieve internal and external balance, stimulate
exports, reduce government spending/ subsidies, liberalize trade and privatize
publicly-owned companies. In order to achieve external balance, the Structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) encourage countries to pursue a well structured
debt management strategy. ln the case of Nigeria, the debt problem has persisted
after several years of implementation of SAP. In fact, the burden of the debt overhang
has become more severe. As is shown in Table 1, between 1985, when implementation
of SAPs began and 1992, Africa's total external debt increased by about $90 billion.
Total debt service, on the other hand, rose from $16.6 billion in 1985 to about $30
billion in 1991. Indeed, the ratio of debt to exports rose from 189 per cent to 230 per
cent over the same period.
All these negative developments, from the African point of view, underscore the
need to devise fresh options that are realistic and practicable in order to permanently
and decisively deal with the African debt problem. In order to do this, actual and
unconditional debt relief must be at the heart of any strategy to be proposed. Indeed,
we agree with Susan George's argument that so long as debt reliefis withheld, hunger
in Africa can only be compounded. "If the continent survives its current crisis, it will
be a tribute to the resourcefulness of Africans and to nothing else. External resources
needed to complement local efforts are not flowing into Africa in the quantity or
quality required. Already, Africa is transferring more capital abroad in debt service
and other payments than it is receiving in aid" (George, 1989:86). What worsens the
African economic outlook is the dependence by most countries on the export of raw
agricultural products. The terms of trade for these products are volatile and generally
unfavourable. Advanced countries have ready-made substitutes for them in plastics
and other petro-chemicals. And, as yet, African countries do not have sufficient
resources to effectively diversify their productive base. The next section contains a
new set of proposals expected to address the problem of debt burden in Africa.
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V.

ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING AFRICA'S
DEBT CRISIS

As has been highlighted in the preceding sections of this paper, Africa's debt problems

arose mainly from commodity price failures, unfavourable international economic
environment and instability in domestic macroeconomic environment. Although
specific causes of the debt crisis such as inappropriate deployment of external loans
were advanced, the existing macroeconomic environment appears to be the most
crucial factor militating against the improvement of Africa's debt servicing capacity.
The level of external debt service would not constitute a serious problem if African
economies were properly managed to generate enough domestic resources to finance
due commitments.
Alternative approaches or options for resolving Africa's debt crisis outside the
traditional options would be predicated on the existence of conducive domestic and
international macroeconomic environments. Based on this framework, Africa's debt
crisis has to be resolved through collaboration between both creditors and debtor
African nations. Creditors have not demonstrated enough willingness to provide
far-reaching and substantial debt relief. At the heart of any serious efforts to resolve
Africa's debt problem, however, is the necessity for creditors to be ready to concede
enough grounds on debt relief for Africa to enable the latter generate enough resources
that would eventually be deployed to service its outstanding debt. In other words,
the reduction of Africa's debt service burden to a level that is proportional to the
capacity to service the debt is the key to any solution. To change their attitude in
favour of debtors, creditors need to show more understanding of the peculiar
economic position of African debtor countries, especially those of sub-Saharan Africa.
On a medium to long-term basis, Africa must adopt suitable domestic policies that
would enable it earn enough foreign exchange that could be used to service its debts
without limiting its capacity to finance economic development projects. The
application of the right domestic policies would encourage creditots to extend
generous debt reduction terms to Africa for the mutual benefit of both parties.
Since the debt crisis facing Africa is mainly due to obligations in respect of official
multilateral and bilateral debts, policy would have to be directed at these classes of
debts. Private debts are relatively small, and most of the commercial banks'
components have either benefited from generous rescheduling, including write-offs
or buy-backs at the secondary market. This is, however, not to underplay the
importance of private debt to any long-term and sustainable debt management
strategy for Africa. The largest component of Africa's outstanding debt is in favour
uf bilateral creditors. This is where the major problem lies, not because of the
magnitude of the debt but because of the harsh rescheduling terms which do not
allow for interest write-off or deferment. lnterestpayments that fall due and are not
paid are usually capitalised, thus increasing the stock of outstanding debts. For
multilateral debt, the repayment period is well stretched out and the terms are
generous enough that rescheduling is not allowed. However, the most crucial reason
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for non-rescheduling of 1nultilateral credi ,s lji;~~ in thr> hct th~1t they are relied upon, to a
significant degree, for recycling to funi_: '" .,, . , r>-,gr,wirncs (Crd_•ne, 1989:()3 ). A viable
framework for resolving PJr.1.ca's debt G, -·_1'-, <:1r;c_;l,1 i 1:i ,-,., t]H.' fr)llowi.ng components:
i)

Rescheduling of Outstanding De',, rlwl'd lo Multilateral Organisations
Multilateral organisations should n:.akP it- possihlL' fnr the debts O\-ved to then1
by low-income and heavily distressed countries to bC' rescheduled by! emoving
the non-rescheduling claim in their agreen1ent. Donor agencies could provide
new credits that may be deployed as new loans to other beneficiaries since
rescheduling will reduce amounts available for recycling. For rescheduling to
be meaningful, it ought to include both principal and interest. The capitalisation
of interest payments is a major source of problem for heavily indebted countries.
Furthermore, interest payments on obligations that have fallen due but could
not be paid should be waived (from the point of default). Although the provision
of new money to assist the restructuring efforts of debt distressed countries
trying to rebuild their debt servicing capacity may be difficult, donor countries
should consider such assistance paramount for the growth of the global economy.

(ii) Refinancing of Debts Owed to Multilateral Institutions

Debts owed to multilateral institutions by debt distressed countries could be
refinanced through the purchase of such debts by a third party at a discount.
Thereafter, the financier would reschedule the discounted debt with the debtor
country on concessional terms. The refinanced debt when rescheduled at the
face value less 50 per cent of the discount would be more manageable. This
would reduce the burden of the debtor country and encourage the refinancing
of the debt since a favourable margin exists between the refinancing and
rescheduling rates. The current practice where write-offs are not allowed and
rescheduling of the original debts are prohibited puts serious pressure on debt
distressed countries.
(iii) Concerted Efforts to Reduce the Debt Burden of Debt-Distressed Countries
The persistent appeal to the Group of Seven (G7) industrialised countries by
the World Bank and IMF that the developing countries, especially those in Africa,
require massive foreign investment, concessional aid and substantial debt writeoffs has often been treated lightly. The fact that the non-resolution of the debt
overhang of the developing countries including Africa would impair global
economic growth makes it more compelling for the adoption of a concerted
approach by the industrialised donor countries towards the debt problem.
Anything short of this would pe,petuate the debt crisis, reduce global fmancial
flows, and retard world trade and global economic growth. Creditors and
debtors should appreciate these facts.
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(iv) Introducing Concessional Terms into Paris Club Rescheduling
The current stance of the Paris Club not to reschedule but to capitalise interest
payments has unduly heightened Africa's debt crisis. The Paris Club rules
should be modified to allow for the rescheduling of interest payments in a multiyear arrangement. In addition, debt write-offs or forgiveness if extended to
African countries that lack the capacity to service their outstanding obligations
owing to low export and foreign exchange capacity, would go along way to alleviate
their problems. The foregoing proposals are meant to reduce the debt service
obligations of debtor African countries in the short term, thereby allowing them
to achieve technical improvement in their debt service capacity. This is because
debt reprieve would reduce debt service payments and enhance debt service
capacity, even when the domestic economy has not been sufficiently strengthened.
(v) Economic Restructuring within Africa
This proposal examines the development of debt service capacity which is the
desirable strategy for permanently resolving Africa's debt problem. In order to
complement international efforts at reducing Africa's debt burden, economic
restructuring geared towards raising the level of domestic production, exports
and foreign exchange earnings should be pursued vigorously. This approach
may not necessarily be very helpful where the debts to be repaid were on a
short to medium-term basis. However, it would be most useful as a medium to
long-term approach to resolving the debt crisis if creditors fail to give major
concessions. Monetary and fiscal balance must be maintained while government
deficits should be reduced to tolerable limits. The acquisition of foreign loans
should only be for the execution of self-financing projects. In addition, efforts
should be made to raise the level of domestic capital formation so as to reduce
tl1e need for massive injection of foreign loan resources into Africa's development
efforts. Since it may be difficult for Africa not to have recourse to external
loans, the most viable and lasting option open to it is to develop the capacity to
service its loans commitments. This can be done through expanding its export
base by providing more incentives to exports and diversifying their export
commodities so as to produce goods that would be more rompetitive and attract
higher values in the international market. The declining prices of primary
commodities in the world market appear to favour the manufacturing option.
The above discussion shows that a global debt strategy for ameliorating the debt
crisis of Africa would have the following elements: "improved policies which are
expected to raise their rates of economic growth, official support from governments
and multilateral agencies, new money from official and private lenders, and growing
and open markets in the industrial countries for debtor countries' export" (IMF Survey,
l '190:24). Apart from concerted efforts by creditor countries to assist debtor nations
through concessionary debt reduction and debt burden alleviation, macroeconomic
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balance and the pursuit of growth-oriented structural adjusbnent in the debtor nations
are essential for any meaningful reduction in the debt burden of the heavily distressed
developing rountries, including those in Africa. This would also enhance the building
of Africa's debt servicing capacity which would provide a permanent basis for
resolving Africa's debt burden. The debt servicing capacity of African countries
would be better enhanced through the development of the export sector, the
acquisition of productive foreign capital and an increase in domestic savings.

VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to summarise past strategies for resolving Africa's debt
crisis. The inference has been drawn that Africa's debt crisis has remained even after
the application of numerous options that were fashioned to tackle it. Such options
included the traditional approaches of rescheduling, refinancing and debt
restructuring. Market options and menu approaches through debt conversions, debt
buy-back, among others, have also been applied.
The apparent ineffectiveness of most of the approaches adopted to reduce Africa's
debt burden was due to a number of factors. These factors can be grouped into three
major headings: the wrong perception of the debt servicing capacity of African
countries by debtors and creditors alike, the declining terms of trade against Africa
and the harsh terms accompanying official debt restructuring. The declining
commodity prices in the world market for primary products turned the terms of
trade against Africa and reduced the debt servicing capacity of the continent. Related
to this was the problem of acquiring external loans that yielded low marginal
productivity or negative productivity. One of the major problems facing Africa at
the moment is the unfavourable structure of its outstanding debts. Most of the debts
are owed to bilateral creditors under the aegis of the Paris Oub. The rescheduling
terms of bilateral debts under the Paris Oub are so stringent that without some form
of write-offs the stock of debt arising from this source would hardly decline. Although
the IMF and World Bank have canvassed debt write-offs for the heavily indebted
low-income countries, many countries in Africa are yet to benefit from the gesture.
The resolution of Africa's debt crisis should be a collaborative endeavour between
debtors and creditors. Both the domestic and international macroeconomic
environments should be conducive and should provide the impetus for accelerating
the rate of growth of the economies of Africa and the industrialised rountries. This
would enable Africa to build up its debt servicing capacity while it would be possible
again for the creditor nations to engage in concessional lending. The specific proposals
made under a new framework for resolving Africa's debt crisis included rescheduling
of outstanding debts to multilateral institutions, refinancing of debts owed multilateral
institutions, introduction of concessional terms into Paris Oub rescheduling and
economic restruch.lring within Africa.
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TABLE 1
AFRICA: EXTERNAL DEBT STOCK AND STRUCTURE, 1980 - 1993
(USS bn)

Total Debt

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

1986 1987 1988

1989 1990

84.8 109.8 122.4 129.7 132.l 145.6

179.1 208.3 213.5

221.0 235.2

1991 1992 1993

I

235.4 233.8

238.3

28.2

30.3

ByMaturily
23.4

24.2

22.4

22.7

25.9

a. Short tenn

9.5

20.2

22.8

b. Longterm

75.3

89.6

99.6 106.3 107.9 123.2

156.4 182.4 186.1

27.4

191.5 207.1

29.4

28.1

208.8 205.6 208.0

26.7

30.5

40.4

58.2

102.1 123.6 128.5

135.5 147.1

149.2 152.2

By Type of Creditor
a. OtliciaJ

65.3

69.2

81.4

b. CommerciaJ Bank

36.8

50.9

43.2

41.2

35.2

35.8

42.3

c. Other Private

17.4

18.6

21.0

23.1

26.7

28.4

34.8

46.7

46.9

49.4

38.0

38.1

36.l

155.7

51.8

49.8

45.3

45.4

36.3

36.4

36.4

37.2

1

Figures for 1993 are estimates

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (various issues)

TABLE2
AFRICA: EXTERNAL DEBT STOCK AND STRUCTURE, 1980 - 1993
(per cent of total debt)

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

1986 1987 1988

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993'

ByMaturily
a. Short Term.

11.2

18.4

18.6

18.0

18.3

15.4

12.7

12.4

12.8

13.3

11.9

11.3

12.l

12.6

b. Long Tenn

S8.8

81.6

81.4

82.0

81.7

84.6

87.3

87.6

87.2

86.7

88.1

88.7

87.9

87.4

36.0

36.8

47.5

50.3

52.7

55.9

57.0

59,3

60.2

61.3

62.5

63.4

65.1

65.3

43.4

46.4

35.3

31.8

26.8

24.6

23.6

22.5

22.0

22.4

22.0

21.2

19.4

19.1

20.6

16.8

17.2

17.9

20.5

19.5

19.4

18.2

17.8

16.3

15.5

15.4

15.5

15.6

By Type of Creditor
a. Official

b. Commercial Basnk.
c. Other Private

1

Figures for 1993 arc estimates

Source: Computed from Table 1

Obaseki and Bello
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TABLE3
AFRICA: EXTERNAL DEBT RATIOS, 1980 - 1993
{per cent)

1980 1981

1982 1983 1984 1985

1986 1987 1988

1989 1990 1991

1992 1993 1

a. Debt Service Ratio
(DebtSoru,e/Export,) 12.9

16.2

19.5

18.9

26.0

27.0

27.8

23.4

25.8

25.1

25.5

26.7

28.3

24.6

b. External DebVGDP

27.2

31.4

37.5

39.8

40.1

46.6

59.9

66.2

65.1

67.1

62.2

61.0

59.1

57.4

,. External Debi/Export

90.2 116.3 153.8 170.4 169,0 189.0

d. btterest Service Ratio
(lnleresl/Export.s)

257.4 262.8 262.1

254.0 234.9 236.7 229.7 219.6

6.7

9.1

11.4

11.4

10.8

11.8

13.4

10.4

11.4

11.2

10.9

12.1

11.3

10.1

22.4

10.9

6.3

5.6

4.9

6.3

4.8

4.8

4.9

5.4

6.9

6.8

7.0

6.9

e. Reserves/External

Debt'

1
Figures for 1993 arc estimates.
2R.cscrvcs arc derived by converting reserve position in SOR into US Dollars.
Smm;e: IMF, World Economic Outlook (various issues)
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